Measuring Progressivity and Inequality by DUCLOS, Jean-Yves






Address: Département d’économique, Pavillon De Sève, Université Laval, Québec,
Canada, G1K 7P4; tel.: (418) 656-7096; fax: (418) 656-7798; email: jduc@ecn.ulaval.ca
* I wish to thank Irwin Gillespie, Robert Howard and Peter Lambert for their
helpful advice and comments. I am also grateful to Martin Tabi for his loyal research
assistance, and to the British Central Statistical Office and the ESRC Data Archive for
permission to use FES data. This research was financed by a grant from the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
1Résumé
On définit une classe générale d’indices de progressivité qui est cohérente avec
la théorie bien connue de la mesure de l’inégalité et du bien-être social. On démontre, en
particulier, que plus un impôt est progressif, plus la distribution des revenus devient égale,
et plus nos indices de progressivité sont élevés. Dans le cas d’une fonction de bien-être
social additive et d’un impôt progressif, l’indice de progressivité augmente avec le degré
d’aversion relative à l’inégalité. On traite aussi du lien entre l’inégalité des revenus bruts
et la mesure de la progressivité. On dérive finalement une classe générale de mesures
d’inégalité qui ne sont pas affectées par des variations équi-proportionnelles dans les
revenus. Nous illustrons le tout à l’aide du système britannique de taxes et de transferts.
Mots-clé: Progressivité, redistribution, inégalité, bien-être social
Abstract
A general class of progressivity indices is proposed which is consistent with the
well-developed theory of the measurement of inequality and social welfare. In particular,
we show that the more progressive a tax system, the more equal the distribution of net
income and the greater the progressivity index. For an additive social welfare function and
a progressive tax system, the greater the degree of relative inequality aversion, the greater
the progressivity index. We also discuss the link between inequality of gross income and
tax progressivity. A by-product is the derivation of a general class of inequality measures
that are invariant to equi-proportionate changes in incomes. We illustrate the analysis
using the British tax and benefit system.
JEL Number: D31, D63, H23
Keywords: Progressivity, redistribution, inequality, social welfare
21-Introduction
Inequality reduction is surely one of the predominant justifications for the
progressivity of taxes and benefits
1. We therefore propose here a general method for the
measurement of progressivity which is consistent with the well-developed theory of
inequality measurement. This is in line with the early perspective of Musgrave and Thin
(1948) who proposed the concept of "effective progression" to measure "the extent to
which a given tax structure results in a shift in the distribution of income toward equality"
(p.510). In particular, we seek progressivity indices which imply that the greater the
measured progressivity of a tax system, the more equal the associated net income
distribution. Furthermore, since it is clear, as Atkinson (1970) noted, that "any measure
of inequality involves judgements about social welfare" (p.257), the same should naturally
be true for measures of progressivity. Building on the contribution of Blackorby and
Donaldson (1984), our general method makes this dependence explicit.
We proceed by presenting an indicator that measures the performance of taxes
and benefits in generating a higher level of welfare than an equal-yield proportional tax
or benefit. An index of progressivity is then defined as a function of this performance
indicator. We show that the more progressive the tax system, the greater its performance,
and the greater its progressivity index. For a progressive tax or benefit, the more
inequality averse the social welfare function, the greater its assessed performance and the
greater the value of the progressivity index. This reflects the dependence of any
progressivity measure upon social welfare judgements. We also present sufficient
conditions for which the progressivity index of a progressive tax or benefit system is
increasing in the inequality of the gross income distribution.
1 See, for instance, the introduction of the remarkable book of Vickrey (1947):
"Progressive taxation may be defined as taxation which tends to promote economic
equality (i.e., a more equal distribution of income, wealth, consumption, or other measure
of economic status)" (p.3). Note also the forceful link between progressivity and equality
made by Blum and Kalven (1953, p.70) in their classic treatment of progressive taxation:
"However uncertain other aspects of progression may be, there is one
thing about it that is certain. A progressive tax on income necessarily
operates to lessen the inequalities in the distribution of that income.
In fact, as was noted at the outset, progression cannot be defined
meaningfully without reference to its redistributive effect on wealth
or income. It would seem therefore that any consideration of
progression must at some time confront the issue of equality."
1Section 2 introduces some notation and defines an index of the performance of
an income tax relative to the performance of a proportional tax. In Section 3, we show
that the performance indicator of a class of tax systems with constant residual progression
can be interpreted as an index of inequality in the distribution of gross incomes that is
invariant to equi-proportionate income changes. Section 4 derives the properties of the
performance indicator with respect to changes in progressivity, relative inequality
aversion, and the inequality of the gross income distribution. From this, we propose in
Section 5 a monotonic function of the performance indicator as a general index of
progressivity.
The progressivity indices proposed by this general method contrast with some
existing indices in two major ways. First, the dependence of existing indices upon social
welfare attitudes is often not clear or explicit
2. Second, changes in the value of some of
these indices fail to be normatively significant. We thus discuss briefly in Section 6 the
difference between some existing indices of progressivity and those implied by our
general method.
Section 7 indicates how we may develop the proposed indices in two
dimensions. First, we account for the separate contribution of individual taxes and benefits
to the progressivity of the overall tax and benefit system. Second, we account for the
contribution of separate socio-economic groups to the redistribution and progressivity of
the tax system over the whole population. Section 8 illustrates the results using the British
tax and benefit system, and Section 9 concludes. As is conventional practice in the
literature, we assume throughout the analysis that gross incomes are exogenous.
2-Definitions
Define social welfare as a general function Wy=W(y1, ... , yH) of H positive
individual incomes. Consider the class W
C of social welfare functions that are increasing,
symmetric and quasi-concave
3 in incomes yh. These conditions ensure that a mean- and
2 See, for instance, Kakwani (1977), Suits (1977), Reynolds and Smolensky (1977),
and some of the alternative measures indicated in Pfähler (1983). For a general discussion
on this, see Lambert (1993).
3 A weaker condition than quasi-concavity, Schur-concavity [see Dasgupta, Sen and
Starrett (1973)], which also implies symmetry in yh, could also be assumed without
affecting the results.
2rank-preserving transfer from a rich to a poor will not decrease social welfare.
Denote the level Ey of equally distributed equivalent income
4 as
(1) Ey E W(E , ... , E) W(y1,. . .,y H )
We will sometimes find it notationally more convenient to assume that the income
distribution is continuous, with distribution function F(•) and density f(•), and with a and
z respectively the minimum and maximum income levels.
An index of inequality Iy in the distribution of y can then be defined as
(2) Iy º 1
Ey
µy





and where the quasi-concavity of W ensures that IyÎ[0,1]. By definition, we note that
(3)
Ey º µy(1 Iy)
Let the distribution of gross incomes X be FX and let the tax schedule (which can be
negative) be T(X). The distribution of gross income and the tax schedule yield the









as well as the distribution FN of net income N(X)=X-T(X) and the distribution F(1-t)X of












4See Atkinson (1970) and Sen (1973).
3To compare the progressivity of different tax regimes, we adopt the Residual
Progression (RP) criterion, which is the only local progression measure consistent with
welfare and inequality dominance under the Lorenz criterion [Jakobsson (1976)]. RP is
the elasticity of net income with respect to gross income and is equal to




We can say that T1(X) is more progressive than T2(X) if and only if RP1(X)<RP2(X), "X.
If, for a particular FX,T 1(X) and T2(X) generate the same mean net income but T1 is more
progressive than T2, then
5
(7) EN1 ³ EN2 , "WÎW
C
Now compare a progressive tax T(X) with an equal-yield proportional tax tX.
By (7), we know that welfare under T(X) cannot be inferior to welfare under tX. To
equalise welfare under the two regimes, we may impose a proportional surcharge tax s
on N(X)=X-T(X) to yield (1-s)N and E(1-s)N. We define as tN,X the unique value of s which
equalises welfare under T(X) and tX:
(8) E(1 tN,X)N º E(1 t)X
We then have the following implicit function for tN,X:
(9) tN,X
I(1 t)X I(1 tN,X)N
1 I(1 tN,X)N
We can view tN,X as a "performance" indicator
6 of the tax system T(X)
7.
Now let W
H represent the class of homothetic social welfare functions that
belong to W
C. We know from Blackorby and Donaldson (1978) that any WÎW
H yields
5 See Jakobsson(1976) and Fellman(1976).
6 The standard relative to which the performance of the tax system T(X) [yielding
N(X)=X-T(X)] is assessed here is an equal-yield tax system with proportional taxation,
tX. Alternatively, we could also compare the performance of a tax system whose net
proceeds are redistributed proportionally to net income, yielding N(X)=[X-T(X)]/(1-t), to
the performance of no taxation, maintaining gross incomes X. For homothetic social
welfare functions, the two types of performance indicators would be identical.
7 For assessing the performance of tax systems with constant residual progression, or
for estimating the average residual progression of unevenly progressive tax and benefit
systems, see Duclos (1995).
4a unique equally-distributed equivalent income function E=µ(1-I) with I homogeneous of
degree 0 in income levels. Conversely, we can derive from any index I of inequality that
is homogenous of degree zero in income levels an associated class of homothetic social
welfare functions W. When W belongs to W




3-Invariance of Inequality Measures to Proportionate Changes in
Incomes
We pause for a moment to indicate how the performance indicator of a
particular class of tax systems can be interpreted as a general class of inequality indices
that are invariant to proportional changes in all incomes.
An important standard for tax progressivity is the class of tax systems of the
form T(X)=X-AX
q, which exhibit a constant degree qÎ[0,1] of residual progressivity
8.
We then have N(X)=AX
q. With this, we can construct an alternative monotonic
transformation of the social welfare function W which gives the average income EX,q of
the distribution of AX
q that yields the same welfare as the distribution of X. In the
discrete setting, this gives:
(11) EX,q A q MX (q) W( AX
q
1 ,. . .,AX
q
H ) W( X 1,. . .,X H )
where







We have that EX,0 º EX, which simplifies to the equally distributed equivalent income
function found in equation (1). We also note that EX,1ºµX. For qÎ[0,1], EX,q is increasing
in q.





8 For an early use of this system, see Edgeworth (1919) and Vickrey (1947).
5IX,q measures, as a proportion of average income, the money-metric welfare loss of
moving from a distribution AX
q to a distribution X.
When W is homothetic, this class of inequality indices has the property of being
the most general one from which we may derive inequality orderings that are insensitive












H, "FX and "l>0 <=> I
*
X=IX,q, for some qÎ[0,1] and "FX.
Proof:
=> Since WÎW
H, Lorenz dominance is the appropriate necessary and sufficient
criterion by which to judge inequality orderings based on I
*
X [Dasgupta, Sen
and Starrett (1973)]. By Jakobsson (1976), the only inequality standard based
on Lorenz curves which is invariant to equiproportional changes l is the
constant RP system, AX
q. Hence, it must be that I
*
X=IX,q, for some qÎ[0,1].
<= For all homothetic W we may assess IX,q through a comparison of the
Lorenz curves for X and AX
q. By Jakobsson (1976) and for l>0, an identical











When W belongs to W






We can easily check that IX,q is precisely the performance index tq,X necessary to equalise
social welfare under equal mean distributions X and AX
q: tq,XºIX,q. Hence, we may see
IX,q either as a general index of inequality that is invariant to equi-proportionate changes
in X or as the performance of a tax system with constant residual progression. The
Atkinson (1970) and Sen (1973) index of inequality is a particular case of tq and IX,q
obtained when q=0. A corollary of Proposition 2 below would be that the greater the
value of q, the lower is IX,q and tq,X.
64-The Properties of the Performance Indicator
We now derive some of the general properties of tN,X. For this, we need to
assume that the tax system does not rerank individuals. We first show that tN,X is
increasing in the progressivity of the tax system.
Proposition 2:
For any WÎW
H and for any FX, the greater the progressivity of T(X), the no
lower the indicator tN,X.
Proof:
The proof is simple in the light of the Jakobsson(1976)-Fellman(1976) and
Dasgupta et al.(1973) theorems linking tax progressivity to Lorenz dominance
and Lorenz dominance to changes in inequality as measured by the difference
in the relative indices IX-IN. The greater the progressivity of a tax system T(X),
the closer to the diagonal lies the Lorenz curve of the distribution of net income
N(X)=X-T(X). This inward movement must (decrease) not increase the value
of the unique relative inequality index IN of an homothetic, symmetric and
(strictly) quasi-concave welfare function W. Hence, by (10), tN,X must (increase)
not fall when the progressivity of T(X) is increased.
A similar result also holds for social welfare functions that are not homothetic,
so long as the distributions being compared have the same mean income.
Proposition 3:
If T1(X) is more progressive than T2(X) and, for a given FX,µ N1=µN2, then, for
that FX, tN1,X³tN2,X for any WÎW
C.
The proof is analogous to the one of Proposition 2.
Let W
A represent the subclass of social welfare functions that are additive in
functions of individual incomes and that belong to W
C.W Î W






where U is increasing and concave. Note that WÎW
A need not be homothetic. Adopt the
following standard definition of relative inequality aversion A(x):
(16) A(x) U (x) x
U (x)
7Proposition 4:
For a progressive tax T(X), the greater the relative inequality aversion of the









*. By construction, we have that A
*(x)³A(x), "x>0, with strict inequality
holding for some range of x. By Pratt (1964) we know that A
*(x)³A(x) is
equivalent to the existence of a function f such that f’>0, f’’£0, and
U
*(x)=f[U(x)], "x>0.











U(1 t) xf X (x) dx
It T(X) is progressive, we have that






is a decreasing function of x. Hence, since U[(1-tN,X)•N(x)] has by definition
the same mean as U[(1-t)•x], it must be that (1-tN,X)•N(x) is greater (lower) than




U[(1-tN,X)•N(x)] is then more equally distributed than the equal mean
distribution of U[(1-t)•x]. Applying the Atkinson(1970) theorem to the concave










f U(1 t) xf X (x) dx
Hence, it must be that tN,X
*³tN,X.
If the condition in Proposition 4 were "the greater everywhere the relative
inequality aversion of the function U(•)", with the strict inequality A
*(x)>A(x), "x>0, we
would find that tN,X
*>tN,X when T(X) is progressive.
9 An alternative and more intricate proof that does not use the Pratt (1964) result can
be found in the Appendix.
8In a well-known paper, Musgrave and Thin (1948) expressed the following
conjecture: "The less equal is the distribution of income before tax, the more potent will
be a progressive tax structure in equalizing income" (p.510). In a different context and
framework, Suits (1977) suggests that:
"There is nothing inherently regressive about a sales tax or even a poll tax.
They are regressive because income is unequally distributed, and the more
unequally income is distributed, the more regressive they become." (p.752)
It is interesting to note some of the conditions under which their presumption holds when
the equalising power of income tax progressivity is judged by the Lorenz criterion.
Let a disequalising but mean-preserving shift occur to the distribution of gross
incomes, causing a movement from distribution X to distribution X’. This could take the
form, say, of a transfer from a poor i to a rich j that does not affect the ranking of the
two units. Average gross income is maintained, but average net income can either
increase, decrease or stay the same, depending on the difference T’i-T’j between the
marginal tax rates of the two individuals involved in the transfer. This is so since the
progressivity of a tax system does not imply that marginal tax rates must move in any
particular direction across the income distribution (except that they must remain above
the average tax rate).
Assume, however, that T’i<T’j ; the disequalising shift will therefore decrease
average net income by (T’j-T’i)/H. Figure 1 then shows how the Lorenz curves for X and














,k1,...,H , and with L(0) 0
On Figure 1, LX is nowhere below LX’ and lies above it in the interval that separates the
poor i and the rich j between which the disequalising transfer occurred. Because we have
assumed that the average net income was decreased by the disequalising transfer, LN
crosses LN’ once from below.
Proposition 5:
Let WÎW
H and X’ and N’ be the distributions of gross and net incomes when
a shift of income that preserves the ranks and the mean but increases the spread
occurs between the gross incomes of individual i and j. Then
(21) tN ,X ³t N,X
9if T’i<T’j and if at least one of the following conditions is fulfilled:
(a) W is sufficiently inequality averse in the income shares of the least well-off;
(b) sN>sN’ (where sy is the standard deviation of y) and W belongs to W
A and
obeys the principle of diminishing transfers
10.
Proof:






















Inspection of Figure 1 confirms that tX,X’³0.
If (a) holds, then tN,N’<0 and tN’,X’³tN,X also holds.
Because the Lorenz curve for N’ crosses once from above the Lorenz curve for
N, when (b) holds
11, it must be that tN,N’£0. Hence tN’,X’³tN,X.
Proposition 5 indicates that, under some relatively weak sufficient conditions,
the performance of a progressive tax system will grow if the distribution of gross incomes
becomes less equal. It is, however, also relatively easy to find instances in which this
result cannot hold. One such instance would involve a progressive tax system with T’i>T’j
and a social welfare function W that is very inequality averse in the income shares of the
least well-off. We would then have in Figure 1 a Lorenz curve for N’ that would cross
once from below the Lorenz curve for N, with the result that tN,N’>tX,X’, and with
tN’,X’<tN,X. A disequalising shift in the distribution of gross incomes then causes the share
of the net income of the least well-off to fall and the performance of the progressive tax
system falls. In such circumstances, Musgrave’s and Thin’s conjecture fails to hold.
10 For WÎW
A, W obeys the principle of diminishing transfers if and only if
U’’’(x)>0, "x>0. This corresponds to a greater valuation of "a transfer between persons
with a given income difference if these incomes are lower than if they are higher"
[Kolm(1976), p.87].
11 See, for instance, Lambert (1993), p.76.
105- A General Index of Progressivity
For notational convenience, we now define an index of equality eX as eX=1-IX.
For homothetic social welfare functions, we have that eX=(1-tN,X)eN. An index of






and measures the percentage change in equality induced by taxation. A proportional tax
regime will have tN,X=0 and PT=0; the greater the performance indicator t, the greater the
progressivity index PT.
For homothetic social welfare functions, values of tN,X and PT are easily linked

















Social welfare will therefore increase under the tax T(X) if tN,X exceeds the average rate
of tax t or, equivalently, if progressivity PT is sufficiently large to compensate for the fall
in average income incurred through taxation.
Some well-known indices of progressivity and redistribution can
straightforwardly be derived as particular members of the class of indices PT. If, for
instance, we consider the generalised Gini indices of inequality GX proposed by
Yitzhaki(1983) and Donaldson and Weymark (1980), which are defined by:






[1 F X(x) ]
v 1 fX (x) dx , v>1
we find the corresponding level of equally distributed equivalent income to be:




x[1 F X(x) ]





GX (v) GN (v)
1 GX (v)
This generalises a normalisation of the well-known Reynolds-Smolensky (1977) index of





generalises the Musgrave and Thin (1948) index of effective progression.
6- Comparisons with Some Other Indices of Progressivity
Kakwani (1977) and Suits
12 (1977) have proposed progressivity indices that
are homogeneous of degree zero in the level of taxes T(x), that is, that are invariant to
proportional changes in the level of taxation across the income distribution. Though often-
used, these measures can exhibit important flaws.
A general class of measures which exhibit these flaws is the general class of
scale invariant aggregate measures of the tax redistribution effect introduced by Pfähler
(1987). The class subsumes the Kakwani and the Suits index. These measures are not
defined and cannot be used when t=0, e.g., whenever the tax system is purely
redistributive. Another flaw is that a proportional change in T can easily make it more or
less progressive and more or less inequality-reducing according to equation (6), even
though this proportional change will fail to alter the Kakwani or Suits indices. In the
terms of Blackorby and Donaldson (1984), these indices are not ethical.
Take, for instance, tax systems T1(x) and T2(x), with average local tax rates
ti(x)=Ti(x)/x, i=1,2. Let T1 be more progressive than T2 according to the RP criterion of
equation (6). This implies that




12 See also Hainsworth (1964).
12Now multiply the tax schedule T1 by a factor k>0. This linear change leaves
intact the progressivity measures of Kakwani and Suits. For T1(x) to remain more
progressive than T2 at any point x, it must, however, be that
(32) k>
t 2(x)
[1 t2(x)]t1 (x) t2 (x)t1(x)
, "x>0
Otherwise, T2 becomes more locally progressive and may lead to less inequality and more
redistribution than T1.
An example is provided by the table below, where two taxes, A and B, are
alternatively applied onto the same distribution of gross income. Under tax A, net
incomes are clearly more equal than under tax B, but the poorer individual, individual 1,
bears a lesser share of the total tax burden under tax B than under tax A.
Individual 1 Individual 2 Total
Gross income 21 80 101
Tax A 1 50 51
Net income under tax A 20 30 50
Tax B 0 1 1
Net income under tax B 21 79 100
Which of tax A or B is then the more progressive? Any measure of progressivity that ties
progressivity to inequality reduction would conclude that tax A is the more progressive.
Progressivity indices that are homogeneous of degree zero in the level of taxes would,
however, necessarily indicate that tax B is the more progressive. To compare
progressivity, we find it both sensible and consistent with the tradition of public finance
to adopt the first standard, that of inequality reduction. Any consequent measure of
progressivity based on that standard must necessarily be consistent with progressivity
rankings based on the performance index tN,X, for a particular normative attitude towards
inequality and social welfare. Measures that are homogeneous of degree zero in the level
13of taxation are then better seen as indices of tax departure from proportionality
13.
7-Extension of the Progressivity Index
7.1-Extension to several taxes





Denote by j one of the J=M! possible orderings of taxes from which we can
construct the transition from gross income to net income. We define em;j as the equality
of income when tax Tm has just been added to all the taxes that precede Tm in the
ordering j. Let e-m;j represent the equality of income just before tax Tm is added
14.
We can then define
(34) Pm; j
em; j e m; j
eX
Pm,j is positive if and only if a gain in the performance of the tax system is registered
when tax Tm is added.







An alternative index of progressivity Pm;j







13 Indices of tax departure from proportionality may sometimes help in the
construction of progressivity indices consistent with the standard of inequality reduction.
For instance, Pfähler (1987) shows that progressivity indices associated with the Mehran
(1976) class of linear inequality indices can be expressed as the product of the average
rate of taxation with associated indices of tax departure from proportionality.
14 If, for example, there were M=2 taxes, there could be J=2 possible orderings of
taxes. We could have, for instance, j=1 for the case in which T1 appears first in the
construction of net income (giving e1;1), followed by T2 (giving e2;1). For j=2, T2 appears
first in the ordering, yielding e2;2, followed by T1, yielding e1;2. We would then have
e-2;1ºe1;1 and e-1;2ºe2;2.











We can check that PT
BD=1+PT.
We may be concerned that the progressivity Pm;j of tax Tm generally depends
on the combination of taxes (implied by the ordering j) to which Tm is added. Because
of this, we may wish to average Pm;j over all J possible orderings to yield an average













7.2-Additivity in the Welfare of Subgroups
If, besides being homothetic, our social welfare function is additive in the
welfare of any set of exclusive subgroups of the population, it is well-known that it must























lnx fy(x) dx , if e 1
Let G subgroups divide completely and exclusively the population. Denote by
f
g(x) the density of the observations in a subgroup g, by pg the share of the population
found in subgroup g, and by M
g(1-e) the welfare of subgroup g considered as a group. We
have that



































































































g are respectively the average gross income and the average rate of tax




















































16This decomposition for PT takes into account the population weights, the
average gross income of group g relative to the overall mean income, the tax rate t
g
relative to t, the equality of gross incomes in group g relative to equality in the overall
population, and tax progressivity within group g. Ceteris paribus, (1) the greater the
correlation between group progressivity and average net income of a group g, or (2) the
greater the correlation between group progressivity and population share, then the greater
the progressivity of the tax system. The product g
g(1+PT
g) indicates that the achievement
of a given level of progressivity PT
g will have the greatest overall impact if it has been
obtained from an initially relatively equal group distribution.
For e=0, we have that PT=0. As e increases, PT takes more and more account
of those groups that include the least well-off members of the population, and it measures
progressivity more and more according to the redistributive properties of T(X) towards










by which progressivity equals the proportional increase in the share of the least well-off
member of the population.
8- Illustration
We now illustrate the application of the above results using the 1985 British tax
and benefit system. Our sample of 4471 families is drawn from the 1985 Family
Expenditure Survey (FES). The FES is a continuous enquiry into the income and
characteristics of private households in the United Kingdom. To compute the tax liabilities
and benefit entitlements of the families, we make use of the tax and benefit model
described in detail in Duclos (1992). For the purposes of our illustration, we do not model
the benefits granted in kind by the state, such as those provided by health and education
expenditures, nor do we include general housing subsidies, local authority taxes or indirect
taxes, or the implicit subsidies or taxes generally implied by various government
regulations and activities. The computations do, however, account for the major
components of the personal income tax system and of the social security and state benefit
system. Here, we regroup these taxes and benefits into four categories:
17A- Various benefits: including child benefit, one-parent benefit, unemployment
benefit, National Insurance Basic Pension, and diverse disability and injury benefits; these
various benefits average 13% of gross income.
B- Personal income taxation: the personal income tax system (which features
personal tax allowances and marginal tax rates ranging from 30% to 60%, but net of
mortgage interest tax relief) and National Insurance Contributions; these taxes amount to
28% of gross income.
C- Family Income Supplement and Supplementary Benefit (net of housing
subsidy component), averaging 2% of gross income.
D- Housing dependent benefits, that is, Housing Benefit (for relief on rents and
local property taxes), mortgage interest tax relief, and the housing subsidy element of
Supplementary Benefit, representing 7% of gross income.
To adjust for varying household composition and size, we use the equivalence
scale implicit in the scale of the main social assistance programme, Supplementary
Benefit. Family weights reflect family size and a statistical adjustment for differential
population representation in the FES sample. Gross income includes, among other things,
labour income, interests and dividends, receipts from private pensions, statutory sick pay,
and allowances from friends and former spouses. A more proper basis on which to assess
the progressivity of taxes and benefits would also incorporate, for instance, imputed rent
from owner-occupied housing and accrued capital gains. In the presence of sound capital
markets, we might also rather be concerned with redistribution and progressivity over the
lifetime.
We start by illustrating the decomposition of total progressivity into the
contribution of separate taxes and benefits. As in equation (38), the separate contribution
of a tax m is the average over all possible j orderings of the Pm;j defined in (34). For
expositional clarity, we normalise Pm by PT= , the progressivity of the sum of the
m
Pm
taxes and benefits. On Figure 2, we show Pm/PT on the left axis for the four categories
of taxes and benefits defined above. We then depict PT along the right axis.
Figure 2 indicates that, as expected, we value the progressivity of the total set
of taxes and benefits more and more as inequality aversion increases, and these valuations
imply a performance indicator tN,X that increases to 0.81 when e=0.95. The contribution
of categories A to D of taxes to total progressivity varies generally with e.A sa
proportion of total progressivity, the progressivity of benefits A first increases and then
18falls to about a third. In spite of their low average size (2% of gross income), benefits C
-- whose grant is specifically targeted towards the low income population -- contribute
a respectable and increasing portion of total progressivity. A similar comment applies to
the somewhat more important (7% of gross income) housing-dependent benefits. For low
values of the relative inequality aversion parameter, personal taxes B contribute almost
one fourth of total progressivity, but that contribution falls to 5% as e reaches 0.95.
16
Taxes B are thus first deemed more progressive than benefits C and D, but they end up
being assessed as the least progressive of all tax and benefit categories. Whatever the
value of e, however, the sum of the progressivity of transfers (A,C and D) exceeds that
of taxes (B).
Figure 3 shows how the progressivity of the tax and benefit system over
separate population subgroups, P
g
T, varies with values of the inequality aversion parameter
e ranging between 0.05 and 0.95. For this, we divide the population first into younger
families and older families (for which at least one of the members is aged 60 or more).
For younger families, we then have families without children, two-adult families with at
least one child, and one-adult families with at least one child. Figure 3 shows that P
g
T is
everywhere above zero for all groups, and thus that the tax and benefit system is deemed
progressive for all groups and for all values of e. Its assessed degree of progressivity,
however, increases with e, with corresponding increases in the performance indicator tN,X
measuring the average surtax rate which could be imposed to bring welfare to its level
under proportional taxation. The index of progressivity over the whole population lies
between the index of progressivity for the group of two-adult families with children,
which is everywhere the lowest, and the index for the three other groups.
Table 1 illustrates the decomposition of equation (46), where tax and benefit
progressivity over the whole population is split into tax progressivity over separate
population subgroups; for this, we choose e=0.5. Line A of Table 1 shows that 31% of
individuals live in younger families without children, 44% in two-adult families with
children, and the rest in one-parent (4%) and older families (22%). Line B indicates the
ratio of average group income to average population income. Young families without
children are, on average, the better off, with older and one-parent families the poorest.
The movement from line B (gross income) to line C (net income) exhibits the level of
16 This is notwithstanding the feature that Pm for taxes B does increase, despite its
rapid fall relative to PT.
19redistribution across groups. Average income of young families without children falls by
10% relative to the population average, while the same figure for one-parent and older
families almost doubles.
Equality of gross income within groups, relative to gross income equality for
the whole population, is shown on line D of Table 1. The least equally distributed group
incomes are those of one-parent and older families, a reflection of the large relative
variations in the gross incomes of the members of these families. The assessed group
progressivity P
g
T of the tax and benefit system is in inverse relation to gross income
inequality, as displayed on line E. Thus, the less equally distributed gross income seemed
to be in a group, the more progressive and the more performant the British tax and benefit
system seems to be for that group. This is not surprising in the light of the results of
Figure 2, which revealed that transfers were the most progressive and the most
redistributive.Suchtransfersaffectdisproportionatelyolderandone-parentfamilies.When
we multiply gross income equality by one plus the percentage change in group inequality,
(1+P
g





N/eX, which is the ratio of group equality of net income to
population equality of gross income. Line F shows that, through the application of
different group progressivity, the tax and benefit system succeeds in bringing equality of
net income within a group to approximately the same value for all groups.
Line G weights this ratio of net income equality to population gross income
equality with the ratio of net income group averages to net income population average
(line C) and with population share (line A). Because equality of net income is
approximately the same for all groups, line G is roughly proportional to population share
and the ratio of line C. When we normalise those weighted contributions of group
progressivity by (1+PT)
1-e, we find terms which must sum to one. These terms are shown
on line H, and we may consider them as the weighted contribution of group progressivity
indices to progressivity over the whole population. Because the ratio of net income
equality to gross income equality for the population is the same for all groups, we find
on line H that the contribution of each group is quite close to the population share of the
group.
Figure 4 indicates how those group contributions to overall progressivity vary
with values of the ethical parameter e. The contributions for the group of two-adult
families with children and for the group of one-parent families vary very little with e,
hovering around 0.43 and 0.04, their respective population share. The contribution of
20younger families without children falls steadily as we become more averse to inequality,
with an associated increase in the contribution of the group of older families. This is
explained by the greater importance of redistributive benefits (e.g., pensions) among older
families, relative to younger families without children who are mostly affected by taxes.
As shown on Figure 2, the assessed progressivity of such taxes does not increase so much
with the inequality aversion parameter. Thus, the more inequality averse we become, the
more we value the progressivity of transfers relative to taxes, and the more overall
progressivity is measured through the groups relatively more affected by such transfers.
9- Conclusion
We propose a general class of progressivity indices P that is consistent with the
well-developed theory of the measurement of inequality and social welfare. The tax
system is deemed progressive (regressive) when P>0 (P<0) and equivalent to a
proportional tax system when P=0. The progressivity indices are a function of a money-
metric measure of the superiority (or inferiority) of an income tax regime over an equal-
yield, proportional tax system. A simple transformation of the progressivity indices,
P/(1+P), yields the size of an average surcharge tax which the state could levy while
bringing social welfare to its level under proportional taxation. In addition, we show that
the more progressive a tax system, the more equal the distribution of net income and the
greater the progressivity index. For an additive social welfare function and a progressive
tax system, the greater the degree of relative inequality aversion, the greater the
progressivity index. We also discuss the link between inequality of gross income and tax
progressivity.
A by-product of the analysis is the derivation of a general class of inequality
measures that are invariant to equi-proportionate changes in incomes. This class of
inequality measures can equivalently be interpreted as the performance of an income tax
with constant residual progression. We also show how the proposed progressivity indices
can be decomposed into terms accounting for the contribution of separate taxes and
benefits to the progressivity of the overall tax and benefit system and into terms
accounting for the contribution of separate groups to progressivity over the whole
population. We finally illustrate the analysis using the British tax and benefit system.
21Appendix
For an alternative proof of Proposition 4, we must first prove the following
lemma:
Lemma A1:






[F (1 t)X(x) F(X T)(1 s)( x )]d x
C s (z) sµ X (1 t)
For T(X) progressive, there exists a x
^ such that ¶Ct(x)/¶x ³0 for x£x
^ and








^ the net income derived from the
progressive tax schedule and the performance tax t thus equals the net income under the
proportional tax t. The average tax rate tx at x=x
^ then equals [1-(1-t)/(1-t)]. By the
progressivity of T(x), we have ta<1-(1-t)/(1-t) and that tz>(1-t)/(1-t). It must also be that
tx>[1-(1-t)/(1-t)] for all x>x
^ and that tx<[1-(1-t)/(1-t)] for all x<x
^.
Denote DGLt(p) as the difference between the generalised Lorenz curves for the
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The derivative of DGLt(p) with respect to w is simply the difference [w-T(w)](1-t)-w(1-t)
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22Hence, since, at w=x






Ct(w1)³Ct(w0), for all w0 and w1 such that w0£w1£x
^
Ct(w1)£Ct(w0), for all w0 and w1 such that x
^£w0£w1
and thus that ¶Ct(x)/¶x ³0 for x£x
^ and ¶Ct(x)/¶x £0 for x³x
^. It is also apparent from the
continuity and differentiability of Ct that the strict inequalities ¶Ct(x)/¶x >0 for x£x
^ and
¶Ct(x)/¶x <0 must hold for some ranges of x below and above x
^.
Proof of Proposition 4:
For a progressive tax T(X), the greater the relative inequality aversion of the
function U(•), the no smaller can be the performance indicator tN,X.
Proof:
Let the general functional form A(x) denote the relative inequality aversion of the
function U(x):
(53) U (x) x
U (x)
A(x) , x>0
Integration of the above differential equation yields:










Consider a step increase b in the inequality aversion function for 0<q<x<r, with q and r
arbitrarily close to each other:
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lnr lnq U (x) , ifx³r
Denote by Ds the difference between the level of additive social welfare obtained under
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where U(•) is increasing and concave. [By the Jakobbson-Fellman (1976) theorem, we
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where C’s(x) is the derivative of C with respect to x. Integrating by part the first integral
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Now consider (65) at the initial welfare-equalising s=t0 such that Dt0=0. By
(63), we know that




U (x) Ct0(x) dx

















U (x) Cs (x) dx
Now define x
^ such that [x
^-T(x
^)](1-t)=x
^(1-t). Lemma A1 tells us that C’t0(x)³0 for x£x
^
and C’t0(x)£0 for x³x
^. When T(X) is progressive, it is also apparent that the strict
inequalities C’t0(X)>0 and C’t0(X)<0 are obtained for at least some range of x<x
^ and x>x
^,
25respectively. Inspection of (68) reveals that:
(67) ¶Ds
¶b s t0
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where y max{ q, min{ˆ x,r} }
By Dt0=0, by the first line of (63), and by Lemma A1, it must be that the first term on




and it must be that dt/db³0.
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28Table 1
Decomposition of Total Progressivity into the Contributions
of Four Groups (e=0.5)
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A: Various benefits B: Personal taxation
C: Family Supplement and
Supplementary Benefit
D: Housing dependent benefits Total ProgressivityFigure 3 
Progressivity Indices of Four Groups
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Group Contributions to Overall Progressivity
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